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THE SLAVERY OF EMANCIPATION
Guyora Binder*
I. THE CLAIM: MANUMISSION IS NOT ABOLITION
The Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution com-
mands that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist."'
What has been the effect of this command?
It will serve my present purpose to offer the following too-
simple answer to this complex question: the Thirteenth Amend-
ment secured little more than the manumission of slaves already
practically freed by the friction of war. It guaranteed, in Confeder-
ate General Robert Richardson's now well-known phrase, "noth-
ing but freedom."
2
Supposing this answer to be true, a further question presents
itself: Did the Thirteenth Amendment's effect fulfill its command?
Did universal manumission abolish slavery?
A full answer to this question would require a rich historical
account of the evolving institution of American slavery, the fea-
tures of that institution that survived the Reconstruction era, and
how those features evolved in the ensuing century and a quarter. I
have no intention of providing such a full history here. I intend
only to argue for the indispensability of such a full history to the
task of interpreting and applying the Thirteenth Amendment. I
mean to argue for the relevance of remote and recent history to the
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment by arguing against the
sophistry that would make General Richardson's crabbed account
of abolition true by definition.3 Thus, I will not argue that aboli-
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
2 See ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND Irs LEGACY 6
(1983).
3 In his Comment, Professor Benedict reports-plaintively, as I read him-that this
paper deconstructs and reconstructs the idea of freedom and slavery "until we wonder
whether we know what we are talking about." Michael Les Benedict, Comment Guyora
Binder, "The Slavery Of Emancipation," 17 CARDoZO L. REV. 2103, 2103 (1996). 1 must
confess that this paper is meant to provoke uncertainty about the meaning of freedom and
slavery, at least insofar as the alternative to such uncertainty is a reductive definition of
slavery that places it at a safe distance from contemporary American society. The meaning
of freedom and slavery-and so the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment-is a herme-
neutic problem that confronts us with an obligation to interpret our national past and, in
doing so, to "reconstruct" ourselves. A central claim of this paper is that when we speak of
freedom and slavery we do not know "what we are talking about" and should not speak
with self-assurance.
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tion must mean more than universal manumission, but merely that
it may. Abolishing the institution of slavery may entail more than
manumitting slaves for the simple reason that manumission was it-
self an important feature of that institution. Thus, I propose the
paradoxical possibility that the institution of slavery could persist
without any individual being lawfully held as a slave.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF SLAVERY AND THE CRISIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The claim that slavery may persist to this day obviously sug-
gests that the Thirteenth Amendment retains unrealized
emancipatory import. But I would draw attention to a second, less
obvious implication of my thesis, an implication for constitutional
theory rather than constitutional law or politics. Slavery's survival
provides a novel explanation for the skepticism that pervades con-
temporary discussions of constitutional interpretation.
Epistemological skepticism about interpretive method in law
is actually of relatively recent origin. For much of the nation's his-
tory, elites shared a conception of legal reasoning as a pragmatic
process of adapting legal rules to evolving social custom.' This is
the way Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor James Kent conceived
the legal process, and it is how the Lochner6 era social Darwinists
and their progressive critics, including Wilson,7 Thayer,8 Brandeis,9
4 See Guyora Binder, Institutions and Linguistic Conventions: The Pragmatism of
Lieber's Legal Hermeneutics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2169 (1995) (prominence of adaptive
interpretation in antebellum Whig legal thought); PAUL KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND His-
TORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 65-133 (1992) (argu-
ing for the persistent commitment of constitutional theorists to the idea of an "evolving
unwritten constitution" during the entire period from the Civil War through the New
Deal); see also GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW
(forthcoming 1997) (on file with author) (tracing the idea of adjudication as the interpreta-
tion of social custom in American legal thought). As Michael Les Benedict helpfully notes
in his Comment, the key early cases narrowly construing the Civil War amendments, the
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), and Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896), all turned on deference to custom and
tradition. See Benedict, supra note 3, at 2103-04.
5 See KAHN, supra note 4, at 41; Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice
in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOL-
OGIES IN AMERICA 85-87 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) (discussing the views of Chancellor
James Kent and Justice Joseph Story on interpretation).
6 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) ("the freedom of master and employ6
[sic] to contract with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same,
cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution").
7 See generally WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES (1911).
8 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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and Pound,10 saw it as well. One finds this evolutionary conception
of law as tradition in Cardozo's lectures on The Nature of the Judi-
cial Process," and in Levi's An Introduction to Legal Reasoning.
12
Adherents to this school disagreed about what were, to them, the
important issues: the content of evolving custom, the institutions
best suited to discern it, and most importantly perhaps, the arena in
which social custom evolved-the bazaar, the forum, or the labora-
tory. All agreed, however, that the evolving needs and values of
society were knowable and legally authoritative.
All this changed after Brown v. Board of Education,'13 a judi-
cial decision that, because of its stress on the growing importance
of public education, Paul Kahn has characterized as the swan song
of the evolutionist tradition. 4 Brown provoked a firestorm of con-
troversy, not just in the schoolhouses and statehouses, but also in
the legal academy. Yet the academic controversy was strangely ab-
stracted from the issue of race relations that animated the general
public, and instead focused on whether judicial review could de-
flect the charge of being "counter-majoritarian' 1 5 by relying on a
sufficiently "neutral" 16 interpretive method. As Charles Black
noted at the time, underlying this anxiety about the legitimacy of
judicial review was an anxiety about constitutional interpretation
itself.17 Constitutional interpretation was, for the first time, seen as
intrinsically opposed to society's "felt necessities."' 8
The persistence of slavery suggests that this methodological
crisis in constitutional interpretation may have had less to do with
the generally discretionary or countermajoritarian character of ju-
dicial interpretation than is often supposed. If I am right in con-
9 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted) (stating that "[t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience
and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful
in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function").
10 See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV.
L. REV. 591 (1911); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Roscoe
Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).
11 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); see also
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924).
12 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
13 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14 See KAHN, supra note 4, at 151-55.
15 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
16 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
17 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY 13 (1960).
18 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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tending that the institution of slavery was deeply and persistently
entrenched in American society and culture, then the condemna-
tion of slavery challenged the legitimacy of the very traditions and
customs on which constitutional interpreters had always relied for
guidance. It was the Reconstruction Amendments' command to
abolish one of American culture's defining customs that rendered
them peculiarly uninterpretable.
The countercustomary thrust of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments is not immediately evident if we look only at the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which seems to invoke prior custom
in its notions of due process of law and the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens. To be sure, the Fourteenth Amendment admitted
former slaves and free blacks to full citizenship and legal per-
sonhood, while implying that the content of these statuses was al-
ready provided by custom. But the Fourteenth Amendment,
whatever else it was supposed to do, was clearly aimed to anchor
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the Constitution; and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 in turn was passed to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment. While the Fourteenth Amendment has been the fo-
cus of so much more litigation and controversy, it is important to
remember that the Fourteenth Amendment was first conceived as
an instrument for enforcing the Thirteenth.
The Thirteenth Amendment's countercustomary thrust is
clear. Slavery was a historically present institution of society that
had emerged as custom before it was recognized as law.19 To con-
stitutionally abolish slavery was to disestablish and repudiate ex-
isting and enduring custom.
If the custom in question were readily definable and confined
to a discrete community and region, one could imagine simply ex-
cising it, like an appendix or a mole. And that is, no doubt, how
many Americans imagined slavery in the years before and after the
Civil War-as the backward and deviant practice of a small elite in
a discrete region against an insular and alien class of people. To
those who saw slavery as essentially alien to America, abolition
would have seemed like a same-day surgical procedure.
But let us make explicit what this seemingly simple surgical
procedure would have been. Let us, in other words, extend the
metonymic identification of the institution of slavery with the geo-
graphic region of the South or the ghetto of the slave quarters. To
excise slavery thus conceived would have meant to let the South
19 See generally Jonathan A. Bush, Free to Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial Ameri-
can Slave Law, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417 (1993).
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go, as the Garrisonian abolitionists once proposed 20 ; or to banish
the slaves, a proposal developed by antislavery Southerners and
embraced by antiextensionist Northerners like Lincoln.21 The first
proposal foundered on the economic, social, and cultural involve-
ment of the North with the South, as the Civil War proved. More-
over, the presence of hundreds of thousands of nominally free
African-Americans in the North and the problem of fugitive slaves
would have continued to complicate the meaning of abolition even
if the North had somehow managed to lose the Civil War.
To white Americans at midcentury, African-Americans were
simply slaves, and to require white Americans to interact with Afri-
cans was to impose upon them the responsibilities of governance.
The only way that the institution of slavery could disappear, leav-
ing what the whites conceived as America unaffected, would be if
African-Americans were to somehow disappear. Yet this second
approach, although promising a "final solution" to the dilemma of
white Americans, was always impractical, and became utterly im-
practicable as a consequence of African-Americans' military role
in winning the Civil War and maintaining occupation of the
South.22
Given the permanent presence of African-Americans, the ab-
olition of slavery could not leave any part of American culture or
society intact. The permanent presence of African-Americans pre-
cluded the one interpretation of abolition that could disguise the
constitutive role of race in American culture and society. Accord-
ingly, the constitutional abolition of slavery-explicit in the Thir-
teenth Amendment, although implicit in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth-did not simply repudiate a geographically and culturally
insular custom. Abolition's challenge to antebellum society could
not be so neatly confined. Abolition could not excise the "peculiar
institution, 23 without scraping every nook and cranny of antebel-
lum culture and society. In this sense, abolition of the custom of
slavery threatened the legitimacy of custom itself.
20 See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS 222 (1975).
21 See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 189,267-80 (1970) (embrace by Lincoln and
other antiextensionists of the colonization idea developed by American Colonization Soci-
ety, founded and supported by antislavery slaveholders).
22 See Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves Author the Thirteenth Amendment? An Essay in
Redemptive History, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 471,484-92 (1993) (moral and practical impli-
cations of slaves' military role in Civil War and Reconstruction).




Constitutional interpretation could proceed by its customary
method as long as the meaning of abolishing slavery was treated as
self-evident. But as soon as the meaning of abolition was placed in
controversy, constitutional interpretation was predictably thrown
into methodological crisis. How could the inherently traditionalist
enterprise of constitutional interpretation define the scope of the
traditions that the Reconstruction Constitution condemned?
III. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING EMANCIPATION
When the Constitution condemns society, where can we turn
for aid in construing it? What aspects of American society author-
ize the Thirteenth Amendment and what aspects are amended by
it? What was the essential feature of the slavery that the Thir-
teenth Amendment commands us to disestablish? Was slavery
property in human beings? Did slavery necessarily involve the
physical compulsion and corporal correction of the laborer? Was it
the same as "involuntary servitude," also abolished by the Thir-
teenth Amendment? What makes servitude "voluntary"? As re-
cently as 1897, the Supreme Court ruled that contractual consent
justified specific enforcement of contracts for personal service.24
As early as 1821, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled such enforced
service "involuntary. ' 25 If slavery included any legally compellable
service, was it better understood as a restriction on mobility or op-
portunity, that is, on what Blackstone had called "personal lib-
erty, 12 6 or on what Justice Peckham would call "liberty of
contract"?
27
Was slavery, in the argument inspired by Locke, the expropri-
ation of the material fruits of the slave's labor? 28 Or perhaps, as
24 See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897). For an earlier Scottish example, see
Knight v. Wedderburn, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 1-12 (1772) (explaining legality of lifetime bond-
age of colliers and saltminers on grounds of its voluntariness); see also DAVID B. DAVIS,
THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823, at 490-92 (1975).
25 See The Case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821).
26 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 130-34 (U.
Chicago ed. 1979) (1765).
27 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28 That [the slave trade] is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied.
That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, is generally
admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits,
and appropriate them against his will, seems to be the necessary result of this
admission.
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66,120 (1825) (Marshall, J.). Locke himself never quite
made this argument. In his eyes, slavery violated natural freedom rather than natural
property rights and "a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact, or his
own consent, enslave himself to anyone, nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary
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Harrington suggested, unfreedom was the economic and political
dependence that inevitably attended propertylessness.29 Or was it,
as Rousseau suggested, an inability to participate in collective self-
governance? 30 Did the institution of slavery, in other words, in-
corporate the noncitizenship that Chief Justice Taney believed
made Africans vulnerable to enslavement? 3' Or was the slave's
lack of political authority better explained in the sociological
terms, offered by Orlando Patterson, of dishonor and social
death? 32 All of these conceptions of slavery suggest very different
visions of the society that has expunged slavery.
Does the abolition of slavery reject the racism that made slav-
ery possible, or does it institutionalize the racism that most aboli-
tionists shared with their opponents? 33 Whose understanding of
the Thirteenth Amendment should we be guided by? Should we
consult the rebels who fought to prevent it and were readmitted to
the polity only on pain of ratifying it? Should we consult the slaves
who also were admitted to the "political family" only as a conse-
quence of its ratification? Or should we read the Amendment as
having been imposed upon the two groups to whom it mattered
most, by a Northern plurality hostile to both?
Even if only the North is ascribed authorship of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the distributive implications of abolition remain
open. Did the Thirteenth Amendment acknowledge to the victims
that slavery had been a terrible crime and pledge to make them
whole? Or was the expropriation of the South's "human property"
power of another to take away his life when he pleases." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT ch. IV, 91 23 (J. Gough, 3d ed. 1966) (1690). On the other hand, natural
freedom entailed the right to appropriate the fruits of one's labor. See generally id. ch. V.
Locke's natural law critique of slavery was exceedingly attenuated, since he went on to
justify the institution of slavery insofar as it arose from capture in a just war or punishment
for a crime deserving death (in contrast to Hobbes, Locke distinguished the state of war
from the state of nature). In addition, he distinguished perpetual service arising out of
contract from slavery, a rejection of contractual slavery that was merely semantic-as soon
as service proceeded on the basis of a contract, limiting the power of the master, Locke
considered slavery to have ceased. Id. ch. IV, 1 24-25.
29 See THE OCEANA AND OTHER WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON WITH AN ACCOUNT
OF HIS LIFE 496-97 (J. Toland ed., 1737).
30 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 141 (Maurice Cranston
trans., 1968) (1762).
31 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857) (Taney, C.J.).
32 See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY (1982).
33 David Brion Davis concludes in his comparative study of abolitionism that: "[t]he
desire to exclude Negroes often preceded explicit hostility to slavery." DAVIS, supra note
24, at 496. For a discussion of the predominance of racist sentiment in the antebellum
North, including among Republicans, see FONER, supra note 21, at 261-74.
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itself a final judgment exacted for the quite different crime of re-
bellion against a quite different victim, the Union? Worse still, was
emancipation conceived as nothing more than a seizure of lawful
property for the public good-less a moral rejection than an expe-
dient transgression of the nation's covenant with hell-which the
nation believed itself bound, sooner or later, to recompense? The
Thirteenth Amendment tells us only that slavery will be abolished,
leaving the distributive implications of abolition to the imagination.
If we think of emancipation in political rather than economic
terms, we encounter additional ambiguities. By occupying the
South and regulating agricultural labor, was the federal govern-
ment asserting governmental authority over the masters and de-
priving them of the self-government in which they took such pride?
And if so, did it permit the masters to continue governing the
slaves, subject to federal oversight? Or did the Freedmen's Bureau
stand in the masters' place, assuming authority over the slaves?
Northerners may even have believed that freedom entailed self-
government but that slaves could not govern themselves until they
had been reformed by the guiding hand of republican government.
Legally prescribed social change necessarily involves coercion-
but whom does the Thirteenth Amendment authorize its enforcers
to coerce?
Thus, for reasons intrinsic to its subject, not its linguistic form,
the Thirteenth Amendment confronts interpreters with multiple
dimensions of ambiguity. Interpreters of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment must decide: (1) which of the deprivations imposed on slaves
to regard as essential to slavery and which to legitimize as inciden-
tal to slavery; (2) which, if any, members of antebellum society to
identify as exemplars of free status; (3) which sectors of postwar
society, if any, were authoritative readers of the amendment; and
(4) how the abolition of slavery redistributes the resources and
power of the masters and what sort of historical narrative justifies
those distributive consequences.
It is tempting to view the Thirteenth Amendment's inherent
indeterminacy as liberating. Since the Thirteenth Amendment pur-
ported to abolish an institution crucial to the nation's antebellum
identity, an interpreter could easily regard it as a tabula rasa, un-
marred by the taint of antebellum tradition. But as I have else-
where argued, interpretation cannot be "free" in that sense.34
Interpretation inevitably takes place within some tradition-so
34 See Binder, supra note 22, at 492-99.
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that if interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment can break free
of particular traditions within antebellum society, they cannot
break free of traditionality.
For this reason, Jacobus tenBroek, hardly a conservative,
turned to history to expand the reach of the Civil War Amend-
ments. TenBroek presented the Civil War Amendments as the
political and rhetorical triumph of antislavery activists, whose in-
tentions alone need be consulted in interpreting the text. 35 But his-
torical consciousness, always divided, is never so neatly divisible.
Where in our history can we hope to find visions of freedom un-
tainted by slavery? We have come to think of a culture as some-
thing more than a collection of separable artifacts, viewing it as a
"structure" or a "web" in which each element derives meaning
from its relation to the rest.36 How can we borrow meaning from
any part of antebellum culture without perpetuating slavery?
We cannot simply assume that emancipation from slavery is
logically incompatible with the perpetuation of the values that per-
vaded slave society and legitimized slavery. To the contrary, eman-
cipation has often had a place within slave societies, arguments
supporting it have frequently accepted the legitimacy of slavery,
and methods of realizing it have often perpetuated important fea-
tures of slavery. Only societies that have once accepted the legiti-
macy of slavery need design a social policy for eliminating it.
35 See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965).
36 The image of the "web" is drawn from Quine's influential article "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism" From a Logical Point of View (1953), in which he characterizes belief as a web
in which every proposition depends upon all the others: change one proposition and adjust-
ments will have to be made. If one removes the proposition "slavery is legal," the rest of
the web must be altered somewhere-but just how or where is indeterminate. Thus, the
elimination of "slavery" need not alter the condition of African-Americans, provided that
adjustments in belief are made elsewhere in the web. The figure of the "structure" is taken
from Levi-Strauss, who posits that a structure "exhibits the characteristics of a system. It is
made up of several elements, none of which can undergo a change without effecting
changes in all the other elements." CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOL-
OGY 279 (Claire Jacobson & Brooke G. Schoepf trans., 1963). For Levi-Strauss, a structure
is not a culture, but a model which attempts to account for and predict change within a
culture. It assumes that any action produces a predictable series of reactions, rather than
opening up an infinite array of possible adjustments. A structuralist account of emancipa-
tion would require the assumption that the preexisting culture endured, but with all of its
elements transformed in predictable ways. For Quine, by contrast, belief systems cannot
be modeled because new data changes them into different belief systems. I am deliberately
agnostic on the question of whether the culture of slave society was an open (Quinean) or
a closed (Levi-Straussian) system, insisting only on its systemic quality, so that on either
view slavery was deeply implicated in American culture, and thus, the real abolition of
slavery would have ramified far beyond the arena of labor relations.
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IV. THE SLAVERY OF EMANCIPATION: MANUMISSION AS
MODEL
The institutional precedents occurring most naturally to white
Americans imagining emancipation would have derived from soci-
eties deeply invested in slavery. Barely able to argue for emanci-
pation without asserting the superfluity of black labor, their visions
of a free society were circumscribed by the problem of finding
something to do with the slave population. This anxiety could vary
in nuance along the continuum of contempt between pity and fear:
how could uncivilized hordes of masterless slaves be kept under
control? Alternatively, how could they be protected from the hos-
tility their presence would surely engender, or the sharp dealing of
those of superior intelligence? How could their willingness to
work for slave wages be prevented from degrading the lot of the
white laborer? Alternatively, how could unsupervised savages
compete in the marketplace with white workers or, for that matter,
be motivated to work at all? The analysis of emancipation policy
coursed through channels worn by proslavery apologetics, proceed-
ing from the premise of the slaves' fundamental inadequacy to the
paradox that slaves could only be rendered fit for freedom by the
perpetuation of white supervision.
To see how the emancipation of slaves can nevertheless reen-
force the culture of slavery, it is useful to distinguish two different
senses of emancipation. We can use "emancipation" either to refer
to the manumission of individuals within a society that retains the
institution of slavery, or to refer to abolition of the institution of
slavery itself.
Manumission does not necessarily benefit the manumitted: in-
dividuals may gain privileges as a result of migration across the
boundary from one status to the other, but they may have to con-
tract away these or other benefits as the price of manumission. Al-
ternatively, individuals can change status while retaining the same
privileges and disabilities, as a result of the redefinition of the
boundary between the statuses. It is even possible for manumis-
sion to decrease the freedom of all if the privileges associated with
both free and unfree statuses are reduced as freedom becomes
more broadly available.
While the idea of manumission depends upon the persistence
of status hierarchy, it does not require that such a hierarchy remain
unchanged by the process of manumission. Instead, we may view
the distinction between freedom and unfreedom as a temporally
contingent battle front in an ongoing social struggle. In a society
2072 [Vol. 17:2063
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defined and bounded by the possibility of unfreedom, free status
may be nothing more than a trench, hastily dug to offer temporary
protection from the assault of the privileged that, because it is too
dangerous for its inmates to leave, fixes them within range of their
oppressors' weapons. The success of some in reaching this refuge
may merely reinforce the boundary between them and those who
remain in the line of fire.
37
While we can imagine emancipation from slavery as a move-
ment across such a boundary, we can also conceive emancipation
as the elimination of the boundary altogether: eliminating slavery
and freedom alike.
The distinction between manumission and abolition may have
been invisible from the Whiggish perspective shared by many op-
ponents and supporters of slavery in antebellum America. Con-
vinced that slavery had become economically precarious and
historically anachronistic, both sides tended to assume that each
individual released from slavery foretold and hastened slavery's
eventual doom. 38 But, as Orlando Patterson reminds us, the re-
lease of individuals from slavery could be perfectly compatible with
the perpetuation of the system of slavery as a whole, perhaps even
necessary to it.
[W]hile we normally think of manumission as being the result of
the negation of slavery, it is also true that manumission, by pro-
viding one of the major incentives for slaves, reinforced the
master-slave relationship. In material terms, no slave-holding
class ever lost in the process of disenslavement or manumission:
either the material compensation more than made up for the
replacement cost of the slaves or, more frequently, the slave was
made over into another, even more loyal and efficient re-
tainer-or the master gained in both instances.
39
In other words, the possibility of manumission often gave slaves an
incentive to cooperate while the compensation provided by a gov-
ernment, a benefactor, or the slaves themselves might enable the
master to buy more slaves. At the same time the social power of
the slaveholder could be reenforced by the increase in number and
rise in status of his retainers.
37 One example is the efforts of late twelfth century English peasants to establish their
free status in the Royal courts, reinforcing the legitimacy of distinction between free and
villein status. See R.H. Hilton, Freedom and Villeinage in England, in PEASANTS, KNIGHTS
AND HERETICS: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 174-91 (R.H. Hilton ed.,
1976).
38 See DAVID B. DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS 81 (1984).
39 PATTIERSON, supra note 32, at 341.
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Part of Patterson's point is that the freeing of some individuals
perpetuates the slavery of others. But we can take the point fur-
ther: even wholesale emancipation may manumit individuals while
leaving the cultural category of slavery intact. Thus, mass manu-
missions have often perpetuated slavery in a different form. Jamai-
can abolition transformed mature slaves into "apprentices" who
remained under the authority of their masters40 ; abolition in our
middle states delayed freedom a generation in order to give the
enslaved race an opportunity to "mature."
41
This cultural continuity between individual manumission and
mass emancipation is important for any assessment of the place of
manumission in American culture. According to received wisdom,
the slave South, particularly in the decades preceding the Civil
War, was virtually unique among slave societies in its hostility to-
ward manumission.42 It was also anomalous in its apparent reluc-
tance to reincorporate freed slaves into a hierarchy of dependence
and deference.4 3 As I will argue, these conclusions may be exag-
gerated. Yet, even accepting them, the anomaly of the mid-nine-
teenth century Southern attitude toward manumission is
considerably attenuated if we take a broader and longer view.
Much of the South's exceptional intolerance for manumission can
be explained as a dialectical moment in its controversy with the
North over slavery itself. The abolition of the slave trade made
manumission costlier by reducing opportunities to replace
manumitted slaves.44 Anxiety about antislavery agitation hardened
the positions of Southern slaveholders during the brief period pre-
ceding the Civil War.45 However, I think it is wrong to isolate
Southern attitudes toward manumission from Northern attitudes,
and to isolate the crisis period from earlier and later periods.
Taken as a whole, antebellum white Americans were ambivalent
about manumission and their attitudes toward former slaves
ranged from horror to condescending tolerance. Eventually,
Southerners did succumb to Northern pressure by manumitting all
of their slaves while subjecting most of them to other forms of de-
pendence and degradation.
40 See FONER, supra note 2, at 16.
41 See COVER, supra note 20; DAVIs, supra note 24.
42 See PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 257-59; EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN,
ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1972).
43 See PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 259.
44 See id. at 359.
45 See generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION (1990).
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When this "abolition" finally came to the South, it came in a
form reminiscent of earlier mass manumissions in the United
States, the Spanish and British Caribbean, and Brazil: in time of
war many regimes have sought to preserve themselves and prevent
slave unrest by placing slaves under military authority. 6 By the
Civil War's end, even the Confederacy had developed plans to con-
script, arm, and manumit slaves. 7
Viewed as an ongoing process, American emancipation con-
formed to a tradition in which emancipation was more a variation
on slavery than a rejection of it-an alternative strategy for mobil-
izing and managing an alien population. If emancipation is seen as
an extension of slavery, the sincerity or insincerity of its supporters
is beside the point. Even sincerely motivated moral crusades to
suppress slavery carry risks to freedom. Implicit in the role of
emancipator is a claim of political authority that may be grounded
in cultural condescension to barbaric masters and helpless slaves
alike. Thus the "international" crusade against the slave trade
served to legitimize first British domination of Caribbean trade and
finally British rule over much of Africa. 8 When American leaders
finally recognized the obligation of white society to accept black
participation, they conceived of it as a duty to share the educa-
tional benefits sure to arise from the company of caucasians. 9
In sum, mass manumission, like individual manumission, has
rarely ended the subordination of the slaves. Conceived as the
manumission of individuals, mass manumission may deplete or
even empty slavery as a social category without eliminating it as an
institution and a set of cultural assumptions that structure power
relations. When emancipation is conceived as the governance, ed-
ucation, assimilation, or rehabilitation of a socially or psychically
disabled slave, slavery has not perished. While we may think of the
Thirteenth Amendment as a victory for the antislavery movement,
we must remember that this movement had to overcome the objec-
tions of a hostile majority. Criticizing slavery in terms designed to
persuade that majority implicated slavery's opponents in the values
46 See PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 287-93 (manumission for military service in classi-
cal societies, Islamic societies, Korea, Brazil, Spanish and British Caribbean, and American
revolution); MARGARET WASHINGTON CREEL, "A PECULIAR PEOPLE": SLAVE RELIGION
AND COMMUNITY CULTURE AMONG THE GULLAHS 121, 123 (1988) (freeing of slaves in
return for service on both sides of revolutionary war).
47 See JAMES M. MACPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA
(1988).
48 See DAVIS, supra note 24, at 235-42, 257-58, 298-309.
49 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); U.S. Office of Education, Equality
of Educational Opportunity (1966) (Coleman Report).
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of slave society. To argue that African-Americans did not deserve
slavery was to reinforce the flattering assumption that freedom was
both evidence and reward for moral worth.5 0 Taking a slightly dif-
ferent tack, Lincoln warmed the hearts of white audiences by argu-
ing that if God had favored whites with greater endowments it was
unbecoming of them to take away the little bit blacks had.5 1 The
critique of slavery as an unconscionable contract impugned either
the courage or the competence of slavery's victims by implying that
they "accepted" degradation. Just as many Northerners opposed
the extension of slavery in order to avoid contact with slaves, ex-
pressions of contempt for slavery were often edged with contempt
for slaves.
If opposition to slavery sometimes reenforced the racism on
which slavery was based, that racism could also undermine the le-
gitimacy of slavery. In importing slaves, white Americans could
believe they were receiving not only laborers, but legal rights of
African origin. 2 Believing that Africans had contempt for one an-
other was a convenient crutch for racism; yet the implicit character-
ization of slaveholding as the barbaric invention of a contemptible
people made that racism a double-edged sword, threatening the
self-esteem of white slaveholders as well. The Colonial fear that
Parliament might reduce British America to a condition of slavery
was more than hyperbolic rhetoric. Painstakingly distinguishing
the predominantly white and free population of America from the
largely nonwhite and unfree population of the West Indies, revolu-
tionary pamphleteers seemed genuinely afraid that the British pub-
lic would associate them with their own slaves. 3 Their rhetorical
50 See Jonathan A. Glickstein, "Poverty is not Slavery": American Abolitionists and the
Competitive Labor Market, in ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ABOLITIONISTs 195-210 (Lewis Perry & Michael Fellman eds., 1979).
51 See Abraham Lincoln (July 17, 1858), in CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LIN-
COLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 82 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958).
52 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 295-337 (1975); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER
BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 71-82 (1968); Robert
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 108 (1985). For a particularly
powerful illustration of this style of thinking, see Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213 (1827) (opinion of Justice Johnson arguing that debt-slavery, although a violation of
the law of nature, is appropriate for such barbaric Africans as practice it).
53 See, e.g., James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764),
in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, at 419 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1965)
Even their law books and very dictionaries of law ... speak of the British
plantations abroad as consisting chiefly of islands; and they are reckoned up in
some of them in this order-Jamaica, Barbados, Virginia, Maryland, New Eng-
land, New York, Carolina, Burmudas. At the head of all these islands . . .
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revulsion at the prospect of being treated like slaves eventually
combined with evangelical religion to temporarily erode the legiti-
macy of slavery during the later decades of the eighteenth
century.54
V. THE SLAVERY OF EMANCIPATION: AN EXAMPLE
We can see the interpenetration of the critique and legitima-
tion of slavery in antebellum American culture, by reflecting on the
case of The Antelope.5 5 This 1825 case applied federal statutes out-
lawing the importation of slaves, providing for the federal "safe-
keeping, support and removal beyond the United States
56 of
African slaves seized aboard slave trading vessels, and authorizing
the President to appoint "agents in Africa" to "receive" them.57
The Antelope, a slave trading ship registered in Spain, but perhaps
owned by an American, was seized by American privateers off the
coast of Africa, with scores of captives aboard. By the time it was
in turn seized by a coast guard cutter off the coast of Florida, its
population had been swelled by additional Africans. Some had
been seized from a vessel under Portuguese registry; some had
been taken from an American vessel that was probably being oper-
ated on behalf of a prominent Rhode Islander who, by the time the
case reached the courts, was a United States Senator.58  Repre-
sentatives of Spain and Portugal sued for the return of these cap-
tives to the supposedly Iberian shipowners rather than to their own
homelands.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, held in favor
of those foreign shipowners who were willing to come forward and
prove ownership of the slaves. Since Somerset's Case,59 Anglo-
American jurisprudence had assumed that slavery violated natural
stands Jamaica, in truth a conquered island; and as such this and all other little
West India islands deserve to be treated for the conduct of their inhabitants and
proprietors with regard to the northern colonies: divers of these colonies are
larger than all those islands together, and are well settled, not as the common
people of England foolishly imagine, with a compound mongrel mixture of
English, Indian, and Negro, but with freeborn British white subjects, whose loy-
alty has never been suspected.
Id. at 435.
54 See DAVIS, supra note 24, at 262-326.
55 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
56 See 3 STAT. 533 (1813).
57 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED
AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 21-22
(1977).
58 See id. at 27-31.
59 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 82 (1772).
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law and could only be established by positive law.6° While federal
law recognized property in slaves, its prohibition of the importa-
tion of slaves, and its provision for their return to Africa suggested
that American law would not recognize foreign title to slaves being
imported into the United States. 61 British precedent indicated that
the slave trade violated the law of nations and could no longer give
rise to good title anywhere. 62 Yet Marshall reasoned that the stat-
ute's confiscatory sanctions could not be applied to foreign slave-
traders who had never themselves attempted to import slaves into
America.
Counsel for the United States argued that even if American
positive law did not punish foreign slave trading, neither did it rec-
ognize foreign title to slaves. If no one could prove positive title to
the Antelope's cargo, the Africans could assert a natural title to
themselves. 63 Yet Marshall concluded there was no such vacuum in
positive law: though condemned by natural law, the slave trade was
sanctioned by the customary law of nations, a part of the positive
law of the United States. Prefaced by an admonition that "this
Court must not yield to feelings which might seduce it from the
path of duty, and must obey the mandate of the law," 6 Marshall's
opinion has been read as an indication of the limited commitment
of antebellum jurisprudence to natural law, an admission that
courts were themselves enchained by slavery.65
Yet the opinion is far more interesting for the way in which a
decision in favor of slavery emerges out of a critique of slavery.
Associating liberty with tolerance, Marshall's opinion critiques
slavery as an unseemly intolerance for inferiority. While condemn-
ing slavery, it also condemns slaves as inferior and thus tolerantly
excuses the moral inferiority of slaveholders. The fulcrum upon
which contempt and tolerance are thus balanced is the identifica-
tion of slavery with its victims. This identification permits Marshall
to present the enforcement of slavery as an expression of tolerance
for its victims and contempt for its perpetrators.
60 See id.; THE SCOT'S MAGAZINE 298-99 (1772). On the reception of Somerset's Case
in America, see COVER, supra note 20, at 87-88. On the potentially quite narrow implica-
tions of the Somerset doctrine, see DAVIS, supra note 24, at 482-89. On U.S. Attorney
General Wirt's invocation of the doctrine in the Antelope Case, see NOONAN, supra note
57, at 103-04.
61 See NOONAN, supra note 57, at 97.
62 See id. at 56.
63 See id. at 103-04.
64 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114 (1825).
65 See COVER, supra note 20, at 102-05.
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In order to appreciate Marshall's astonishing rhetorical rever-
sal, one should recollect the progress of antislavery opinion in the
Western world at the time Marshall wrote. Slavery had been out-
lawed in England by judicial decision in 1772. In 1794, and again in
1804, French legislatures had ratified the results of the Haitian
revolution by abolishing slavery in Saint Domingue. Britain, hav-
ing begun to discourage the international slave trade in the late
decades of the nineteenth century, prohibited it in 1807, the same
year as the United States. Thereafter, Britain endeavored, by di-
plomacy and force, to impose this prohibition on other nations as
well. Abolitionism was a powerful political force in England in
1825 when the abolition of slavery in all British territories stood
just thirteen years away. The revolutions occurring -in Latin
America during the first quarter of the century resulted in the pro-
hibition of slavery in Chile and Central America and in gradual
emancipation plans in Argentina and Colombia. Three of the orig-
inal American states had outlawed slavery during the revolution,
four more had subsequently adopted gradual emancipation plans,
but five more slave states had been admitted to the Union. De-
spite the illegality of slave importation, America's slave population
was growing at about the same astronomical rate as its free popula-
tion.66 As Marshall wrote, the United States probably contained
the largest concentration of African slaves in the world.
67
Yet according to Marshall, the United States stood at the fore-
front of abolition. Nowhere admitting that Americans had en-
gaged in the slave trade, Marshall characterizes this "abhorrent...
traffic" as the vice of "nations who possess distant colonies," ob-
serving that "[t]he Christian and civilized nations of the world, with
whom we have most intercourse, have all been engaged in it."' 68 It
was only "in America" that "[t]he course of unexamined opinion,
... founded on this inveterate usage, received its first check.
69
America's civilizing intercourse first converted Britain. Soon other
governments joined in condemning, or at worst "tolerat[ing]" this
"detest[ed]" practice.7 ° While not perhaps as civilized as America,
66 See ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMANN, TIME ON THE CROSS: Evi-
DENCE AND METHODS-A SUPPLEMENT 33-34 (1974); PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 363
(providing proportion of South's unfree population by decades).
67 See I KEITH HOPKINS, CONQUERORS AND SLAVES: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES IN Ro-
MAN HISTORY 101 (1978) (Brazil had 1 million in 1800,2.5 million in 1850); cf. PATrERSON,
supra note 32, at 483 (U.S. had 900,000 in 1800, 1.9 million in 1830, 3.1 million in 1850).
68 23 U.S. at 114-15.
69 Id.
70 See id. at 115-16.
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the rest of the Western world had ultimately acknowledged the in-
justice of slavery: "[t]hroughout Christendom, . . . war is no longer
considered as giving a right to enslave captives."'" It soon emerges
that the impropriety of thus enslaving a rival people is the funda-
mental principle of the law of nations: "[n]o principle of general
law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of
nations.... It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully
impose a rule on another. '7 2 Yet the consequence of respecting
the autonomy of other nations is tolerance for their barbarism.
While the Christian nations have repudiated the right to enslave
captives,
this triumph of humanity has not been universal. The parties to
the modern law of nations do not propagate their principles by
force; and Africa has not yet adopted them. Throughout the
whole extent of that immense continent, so far as we know its
history, it is still the law of nations that prisoners are slaves.73
It is out of tolerance for African culture that Marshall purports to
justify enforcement of the institution Europeans frequently re-
ferred to as "African slavery."
Piling insult upon injury, Marshall finally appropriates the
doctrine of Somerset's Case to the defense of slavery, insisting that
foreign slave traders can only be dispossessed of their customary
rights by statute:
[a]s no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can make a
law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those whose
governments have not forbidden it. If it is consistent with the
law of nations, it cannot in itself be piracy. It can be made so
only by statute.
74
Perverse as Marshall's racist use of antislavery rhetoric may
seem, it was typical of a culture so thoroughly identified with slav-
ery that it could imagine emancipation only as the replacement of
slavery with some other form of subjection. Consider the two par-
ties purporting to act for the captive Africans in the Antelope case.
The federal government appeared before the Supreme Court to
contest the Spanish and Portuguese claims to the Africans. How-
ever, the government's belief that the Africans had a right to their
freedom did not induce it to treat them as anything other than
slaves. During the seven years that the litigation lasted, the Afri-
71 Id. at 121.
72 Id. at 122.
73 Id. at 121.
74 Id. at 122.
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cans were held in Savannah-even after the city was all but aban-
doned during an epidemic.75 The Federal Marshal brutally
compelled some to labor on his own plantation and hired others
out to slaveholders or to local government, pocketing their earn-
ings.76 John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, later to be-
come President and eventually the most prominent opponent of
slavery in Congress, approved these arrangements as "[v]ery judi-
cious and proper. ' 77 He altered his opinion only upon learning
that the Marshal "intends to swamp the negroes-that is, to work
them to death-before they shall be finally adjudicated out of his
possession."" All in all, about half of the 281 slaves originally
found aboard the Antelope survived the federal government's so-
licitude.79 Neither the American privateers nor the Rhode Island
senator from whom they had wrested some of the slaves were ever
prosecuted for slavetrading, a capital offense.
The "Colonization Society," represented before the Supreme
Court by Francis Scott Key, the author of our national anthem, also
pled the Africans' cause. It was led and financed by Southern
slaveholders. John Marshall was an active member, 0 and Justice
Bushrod Washington, who apparently supported Marshall on all
the issues in the case, was the Society's president.81 Francis Scott
Key informed the Court that the purpose of the federal statute au-
thorizing colonization of recaptured Africans was that "[o]ur na-
tional policy,.. . perhaps our national safety, requires that there be
no increase in this species of population within our territory.
8 2
Believing that the slaveholders' natural benevolence would induce
them to manumit slaves, were it not for the danger that permitting
a free black population would result in miscegenation, the Coloni-
zation Society supported repatriating freed slaves to Africa.83 Yet
75 See NOONAN, supra note 57, at 32, 47-48.
76 He also charged the federal government exorbitant amounts for their maintenance.
See id. at 45-48.
77 Id. at 48 (quoting John Q. Adams).
78 Id. at 79 (quoting Adams) (emphasis in original). Throughout the case Adams was
consistently resistant to the federal government's interference with foreign title to slaves.
His posture had considerably altered by 1839 when he represented the successfully muti-
nous inmates of the slavetrader Amistad, suing for their freedom. See COVER, supra note
20, at 11.
79 See NOONAN, supra note 57, at 31 (281 counted upon capture of the Antelope); id. at
33 (258 make it to Savannah); id. at 65 (204 left in July 1821); id. at 122 (116 died in
Savannah by May 1826).
80 See id. at 105.
81 See id. at 16, 115.
82 Id. at 96 (quoting Francis Scott Key).
83 See id. at 16.
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assuming that African-Americans could not return to African soci-
ety without being reenslaved, nor be expected to govern them-
selves, the Colonization Society established the American colony
of Liberia on the African continent, for which they promulgated
laws.' Such a colony should not be equated with the self-determi-
nation sought by African-American emigrationists, who consist-
ently objected to being "part of any colony in which they would be
subservient to white interests. '85 Instead, Liberia may be analo-
gized to Britain's humanitarian crusade to eradicate African slav-
ery by conquering Africa.86
Eventually 130 Africans-some born after the commencement
of the litigation-were resettled in Liberia as a result of the case,
through the cooperation of the federal government and the Coloni-
zation Society.87 Here the adults were bound to serve for set wages
and the older children apprenticed-none were permitted to leave
the supervision of their employers for at least a year.88 The re-
maining thirty-seven Africans were purchased cheaply from their
Spanish claimants by an American Congressman8 9 who, by a spe-
cial act of Congress, was permitted to keep them in the United
States, notwithstanding the prohibition on the importation of
slaves. The bill was presented as a humanitarian measure since,
according to Representative Dwight of Massachusetts, during the
years of litigation, the Africans "had been put out on healthy plan-
tations, where many of them had acquired the relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, and had formed attachments to the
84 See id. at 87.
85 V.P. FRANKLIN, BLACK SELF-DETERMINATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE
FAITH OF THE FATHERS 89 (1984) (quoting Rhode Island free black emigrationists).
86 The colonization of Liberia yielded a complex dynamic between two cultures in
which American blacks played a mediating role reminiscent of nothing so much as the
experience of Jews colonizing Palestine. To the "benevolent" Southern whites of the Colo-
nization society, American blacks were inalterably African. To their West African neigh-
bors, the colonists were so altered as to appear "American" and even "white." Initially,
settlers continued to live very much under the authority of the Colonization society. By
the 1840s, however, settlers were largely self-governing, had developed strong community
institutions, a good deal of economic autonomy, and a strong, even messianic national
identity. Ironically, however, much of their national pride and personal honor was ex-
pressed in military exploits against their West African neighbors whom they regarded as
barbarous slavetraders and heathens. At times, they joined forces with Britain in these
conflicts. At the same time, their own religious communities and kinship systems contin-
ued to display a West African heritage. See RANDALL M. MILLER, DEAR MASTER: LET-
TERS OF A SLAVE FAMILY 39-57 (1990).
87 See NOONAN, supra note 57, at 135-38.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 140.
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country."90 According to the Speaker of the House, the purchaser
acted "in the pure kindness of his heart."91 Paradoxically, Con-
gress sought to exclude Africans as a fearsome pestilence, while
believing that the most desirable place in the world for Africans
was the very country that held them in such contempt.
VI. MANUMISSION AND THE SLAVERY OF MARKET SOCIETY
The Antelope teaches us that belief in the propriety of white
government of blacks traversed the political spectrum of antebel-
lum America, and was as much part of the idea of emancipation as
it was part of the idea of slavery. Yet the sectional conflict enabled
Northern whites to deny the link between their own society and
slavery. Forgetting that their own free status had been defined by
contrast to the slavery they had protected and profited from,
Northern whites imagined that their society was the product of
contractual choice unfettered by status distinctions. At the Massa-
chusetts constitutional convention of 1853, Henry Williams con-
gratulated the delegates for the fact that
[i]n a free government like ours, employment is simply a con-
tract between parties having equal rights. The operative agrees
to perform a certain amount of work in consideration of receiv-
ing a certain amount of money.... The employed is under no
greater obligation to the employer than the employer is to the
employed; and the one has no more right to dictate [outside of
work] than the other. In the eye of the law, they are both
freemen-citizens having equal rights, and brethren having one
common destiny.92
In 1858 a Boston editor contrasted " 'two kinds of civilization in
this country. One is the civilization of freedom, and the other is
the civilization of aristocracy, of slavery.' -93 And in the same year,
a Cincinnati reporter called for "the introduction upon Southern
territory of the Northern system of life."9 4 Against the background
of these beliefs, Northern Republicans were inclined to see the ab-
olition of slavery as entailing a social revolution; the replacement
90 Id. at 149.
91 Id. at 148-49.
92 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVEN-
TION ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH 1853, at 550 (1853) (statement of Henry Williams), quoted in
Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 335, 351 (1989) (alterations in original).
93 FONER, supra note 21, at 70 (footnote omitted).
94 Id. at 52.
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of Southern status society with the contractual freedom of the
North.95
But status and contract were not so easily distinguishable as
Northern Republicans may have believed. On the one hand, we
need the idea of status to make sense of the concept of contractual
freedom. Thus the notion of a society ordered purely by contract is
hopelessly vague: does it authorize specifically enforceable labor
contracts or preclude them? 96 Only the characterization of some
contractual relations as constrained by status can fix contrasting
forms of contractual relations as "free."' 97 On the other hand, the
"status" of slavery can be characterized and was often justified as a
contractual relationship. 98
95 The locus classicus of the association of abolition with progress from status to con-
tract society is HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY His-
TORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (1891), originally published in
Britain during the first year of the Civil War, in which Maine concluded that it is not
difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees
those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origins in the
Family. It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condi-
tion of society in which all the relations of persons are summed up in the rela-
tions of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order
in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of individuals. In
Western Europe the progress achieved in this direction has been considerable.
Thus the status of the slave has disappeared-it has been superseded by the
contractual relation of the servant to his master.
Id. at 163-64.
At the close of the Civil War, Maine's thesis received favorable notice from some
American reviewers. John Fiske, for example, found confirmation of Maine's status to
contract thesis in Herbert Spencer's doctrine that evolution in the social as well as the
biological sphere was marked by specialization and differentiation. Fiske identified intelli-
gence as the capacity for specialization which he believed enabled adaptation to diverse
environments. See John Fiske, The Laws of History, 119 N. AM. REV. 197 (1869).
96 See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RE-
LATIONS IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 1350-1870 (1991).
97 See the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908);
U.S. v. Hodges, 203 U.S. 1 (1905) (contrasting freedom of blacks to wardship of Indians);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (characterizing some workers as free in contrast
to others); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 336 (1898); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275
(1896).
98 This seems an appropriate place to note a regrettable confusion in Professor Bene-
dict's otherwise illuminating comments. Benedict writes, "the very possibility of being able
to make enough money to purchase one's freedom, Professor Binder argues, led masters
and slaves to think of slavery in terms of contract rather than status." Benedict, supra note
3, at 2109 (emphasis added). The availability of negotiated manumission, and the preva-
lent bargaining over the terms and conditions of slavery, exposed to masters and slaves
that contract and status were perfectly compatible. Contract and status may be mutually
exclusive categories for Benedict, but they were not mutually exclusive categories in the
experience of antebellum masters, slaves, and free blacks. Antebellum African-Americans
who passed from slavery to "freedom" made what amounted to labor contracts while they
were still slaves and continued to suffer subordinate status after they were nominally free.
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Roman law recognized self-sale and capture as the two devices
by which a free person could become enslaved. 99 While there is no
indication that Roman law accorded captives any discretion to
choose death rather than service,100 nontechnical discussions of
slavery have tended to treat capture as a variant of contract or self-
In both of these respects, the experience of manumitted Americans resembled that of
manumitted slaves in every other large-scale society.
Masters and slaves knew that status in Southern society was primarily a matter of
honor and social power, and only secondarily a matter of jural personality. As in other
timocratic societies, status was in large measure a collective rather than an individual con-
dition. Status attached more to racial groups and to families than to individuals. See
Guyora Binder, Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435, 1449-75
(1989) [hereinafter Binder, Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation] (convergent values of
honor family and community in slave and slaveholder culture); Guyora Binder, On Hegel,
On Slavery, But Not On My Head!, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 563, 573, 577-83 (1990) (timo-
cratic and communal values in slave community; slave's collective pursuit and conception
of freedom).
For many slaves, slavery's legal and social nonrecognition of family relationships was a
more important source of anguish than slavery's constraints on their capacity to dispose of
their labor. Professor Benedict rightly points out that Southern law's nonrecognition of
slave family relationships included depriving the slave of the capacity to enter into a mar-
riage contract. But he neglects to observe that, by virtue of this disability, slaves were
precluded not only from making certain contracts, but also from enjoying the status of
husband and wife. Moreover, many of the familial statuses from which slaves were
barred-parent, child, sibling, grandson-are not entered into contractually. Finally, the
manumission of a slave, although it often conferred contractual capacity, did nothing to
alter the legal nullity of her relationships to other family members held in slavery. Thus, to
manumit an individual and confer upon her the legal right to enforce contracts did little to
alter her familial status and nothing to alter her racial status. Moreover, universal manu-
mission did not significantly diminish the importance in American society of these two
form of ascriptive status.
The larger point here is that universal manumission did not represent the transforma-
tion of a society based on status relations into a society based on contractual relations.
While controversy has raged over whether the antebellum South is best characterized as a
tradition-bound, paternalistic community of padrones and peasants, see, e.g., EUGENE D.
GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY 13-40 (1967); BERTRAM WYATTr-
BROWN, HONOR AND VIOLENCE IN THE OLD SOUTH (1986); KENNETH S. GREENBERG,
MASTERS AND STATESMEN (1985), or a modern, mobile market society, see, e.g., JAMES
OAKES, THE RULING RACE (1982); FOGEL & ENGERMANN, supra note 66, it was obviously
both. It was a status society and a contract society and both the North and South remained
such societies after the war.
The construction of status and contract as mutually exclusive categories was just that:
an ideological construct. Its ideological significance lay in its implication that the mere
conferral of contractual capacity on African-Americans tautologically entailed their libera-
tion from the status of slavery. The grip of this ideological construct remains strong. It
has impressed itself upon Professor Benedict's reading of this paper, causing him to equate
my claim that slaves contracted with the silly claim that slavery was not a status.
99 The three lawful origins of slavery were capture during warfare, self-sale, and hered-
ity. See T. WIEDEMANN, GREEK AND ROMAN SLAVERY 23 (1981) (citing M. DIG. 1.5; M.
INST. 1.5).
100 Roman captors did, however, frequently choose to kill captives. See PATTERSON,
supra note 32, at 108.
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sale. According to Orlando Patterson, it is this persistent image of
slavery as chosen that explains the contempt in which slaves were
so often held:
The idea that. . to prefer life to honor betrays a degraded mind
... is a theme that haunts western literature. ... [I]t was the
choice of life over honor that the slave or his ancestor made, or
had made for him. The dishonor of slavery ... came in the
primal act of submission.' 01
Modem social contract theorists were particularly intrigued by
the idea that slavery originated in such a cowardly contract. The
organizing problem for this tradition was how subjection to author-
ity could arise out of what was imagined as an original or natural
condition of independence. Because the civilian tradition treated
slavery as contrary to natural law but nevertheless permitted by
positive law,10 2 social contract theorists saw the passage from free-
dom to slavery as an apt metaphor for the passage from a natural
state of independence to a civil state of political subjection. Thus,
the cowardly contract was an obligatory theme for political theo-
rists in the natural law tradition from the sixteenth to the nine-
teenth centuries. Initially, contractual analysis was deemed to
legitimize slavery along with government. 10 3 Later those discus-
sions evolved into condemnations of slavery based on the uncon-
scionability of its underlying "contract."'" These condemnations
served to distinguish government from slavery, to show that by re-
taining her right to contract in the passage from a natural to a civil
state, the citizen could retain her original freedom.
The contractual origins of slavery were usually more mythic
than real. But in many slave societies, slave status was contingent
on contractual consent in another sense. Contracting was often the
101 Id. at 78.
102 See DAVIS, supra note 24, at 83.
103 See 2 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 103-04, 107-08 (Francis
Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625) (justifying slavery as condition entered into voluntarily or im-
posed upon children to prevent starvation); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 132-33 (M.
Oakeshott ed., 1962) (1651) (despotic dominion over captive justified by captive's consent
in return for being spared); 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTOUM JURISPRUDENTIAE
UNIVERSALIs LIBRI Duo 15 (William A. Oldfather trans., 1931) (1660) (lawful to enslave
those liable for execution, in return for sparing their lives).
104 See LOCKE, supra note 28, at 88 (lawful captor may kill or enslave captive, but cap-
tive cannot contractually consent to slavery); BARON DE MONTESOUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS 237 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748) (captors may not lawfully kill captives
and so may not enslave them; nor can slavery be created by contract because liberty is
inalienable); ROUSSEAU, supra note 30, at 57-58 (liberty inalienable; captor has no right to
kill; even if he did, spared captive would have no obligation to obey); 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 26, 411-12 (repeating Montesquieu's arguments).
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passageway from slavery to-freedom, rather than vice-versa. The
ability of slaves in classical societies to legally purchase their free-
dom made slavery seem less like a fixed status than the contingent
outcome of a hard bargain, the fate of those too poor to purchase a
better life in one type of market society.10 5 Albeit with lesser force,
the same point applies to antebellum American society. While re-
demption was probably 0 6 much less common in the slave South
than in ancient Rome, we know that it frequently occurred and
that it was a phenomenon familiar to many if not most slaves.
Given that some slaves purchased their freedom, the separa-
bility of status relations and contractual relations in Southern soci-
ety depends on two difficult questions: how much manumission by
purchase went on, and were the restraints upon it cultural or
merely economic? If manumission was available to any slave who
could afford the price, slave status could be viewed as contrac-
tual-which by no means implies that it was voluntary.
We have reason to think that considerable bargaining over
slave "status" went on in the antebellum South. It is true that bar-
gains with slaves were legally unenforceable throughout the
South, °7 but enforceable bargains could often be concluded by
free relatives or white intermediaries. In addition, slaves often had
informal enforcement sanctions available. Ira Berlin reports that
[t]he administrator of a Virginia estate found himself unable to
employ a skilled slave profitably. The slave, who should easily
have earned over $150 a year, instead returned a paltry $18
while accumulating medical bills for several times that amount.
Exasperated by the steady drain on the estate, the executor of-
fered the slave his freedom for $400, and the sum was promptly
paid.10
8
Masters frequently stood to gain by permitting slaves to supervise
themselves-by saving supervision costs, by allowing slaves to
travel to markets where their labor would bring a higher price, or
by enlisting the slave's economic judgment on behalf of the
105 See generally 1 HOPKINS, supra note 67, at 115-32 (prevalence of self-purchase in
ancient Rome); ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS 23-24 (1989).
106 I say "probably" because, despite the ubiquity of this assumption, no one has been
able to quantify the frequency of manumission in ancient Rome. But the ease of manumis-
sion in Roman law, the easier access of slaves to lucrative skills, and the wealth of anecdo-
tal accounts of self-purchase all suggest a very high manumission rate, whereas we know
that the number of free blacks in America never exceeded one in seven-many of these
were emancipated by the state, and some as a consequence of escape.
107 See PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK (1986).




master's interests. However, a master could realize none of these
advantages without providing the slave with credible incentives.
Masters had other reasons to bargain in good faith. One in-
centive for the master to honor a bargain was that it would increase
his chances of selling manumissions in the future-manumitted
slaves frequently proceeded to purchase their relatives. Another
incentive was provided by the threat of escape. The experience of
A.T. Jones reveals both forces at work. 1 9 While Jones' parents
had been able to purchase their own freedom, they left several chil-
dren in slavery. Jones and three of his siblings were inherited by
their original owner's son, but Jones's eldest brother was sold to a
miller who taught him the trade.
After serving seven years, he was emancipated, and taken into
partnership by the miller, and... saved considerable money....
This money bought two of us. I was the next oldest, and I made
an agreement to give [the owner] $350 for my liberty, which was
in proportion to what the others paid. Before the expiration of
the time I was allowed to pay the $350,. .. Sam Bennett, told my
master it was a shame for him to set those likely boys free; that
it would have a bad effect upon the other slaves in the neighbor-
hood, and that he would give him $400 for me.... [O]n hearing
that ... in fact, my master had taken the money, I left for Can-
ada. I was satisfied he was going to cheat me." °
The case of Horace Hawkins reminds us that, while escape did not
yield all the benefits of legal manumission, it dramatically de-
creased the value of the master's ownership rights and could
greatly increase the bargaining power of the fugitive slave.
Although a successful runaway, Hawkins concluded upon passage
of the Fugitive Slave Law that "I didn't like to be pent up in Can-
ada, and I saw they were determined to catch me if they could."'I
Accordingly, through intermediaries, he opened negotiations with
his former master for his freedom papers, successfully bargaining
him down from $500 to $200.112
The hostility of Southern law to the presence of free blacks has
sometimes inspired or reenforced the assumption that manumis-
sion was rare.1 13 Yet that hostility should not be equated with hos-
tility to manumission itself. As Paul Finkelman reports "[v]irtually
109 See Interview with A.T. Jones, in JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, SLAVE TESTIMONY: Two
CENTURIES OF LETTERS, SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 431 (1977).
110 Id.
111 Interview with Horace H. Hawkins, in BLASSINGAME, supra note 109, at 443.
112 See id.
113 See PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 284-85, 257-61.
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all slave state legal experts agreed that because the owner had ab-
solute control over the property right in his slave, the owner there-
fore had the right to free his slave and, in so doing, give up his
property right. 11 4 Ira Berlin adds that masters saw manumission
as "a mechanism of control and a means of encouraging divisions
among blacks. The importance of the right to manumit made many
slaveowners reluctant to relinquish it, although they disliked free
blacks."'115 Nevertheless, by the 1830s, most state statutes required
judicial or legislative permission to manumit a slave. 116 Some
states impeded self-purchase by prohibiting slaves from "go[ing] at
large and trad[ing] as a freeman. 11 7 Seven states eventually re-
quired freed slaves to leave the state within a short period of
time, 1 8 although it is questionable how seriously these require-
ments were enforced. 119 Eight states ultimately prohibited most or
all manumission within the state, although only Texas did so before
1857.12° In any case, no state prevented an owner from freeing a
slave by removing her from the state.'' Mark Tushnet therefore
concludes that it was always possible for "a properly written will
[to] effectuate an intention to emancipate.' 122 And what a dead
master could do, a living one could accomplish more easily.
Masters and slaves bent on bargaining over "status" fre-
quently found their way around the law, often with the assistance
of third parties. Israel Jefferson, born on Monticello, bought "him-
self" in his wife's name so that they could remain in Virginia. She
manumitted him years later, when they decided to move to
Ohio. 23 Mr. Bradwell, a Methodist preacher and a shoemaker,
donated most of his purchase price to his church, which bought him
and held him in bondage "to meet the requirements of the law.'
211 4
114 FINKELMAN, supra note 107, at 95.
115 BERLIN, supra note 108, at 149.
116 See id. at 138.
117 See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERA-
TIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 199 (1981) (citing Alabama case of Stanley v. Nelson).
118 See ALA. LAWS, ch. 44 (1883); K. LAWS I 305-08 (1850); LA. LAWS ch. 315 (1852);
MD. LAWS chs. 281, 323 (1831); N.C. LAWS ch. 9 (1830); TENN. LAWS ch. 29 (1831), ch. 102
(1833), ch. 81 (1849), ch. 107 (1852), ch. 300 (1854), ch. 50 (1829); VA. LAWS ch. 63 (1805).
119 See BERLIN, supra note 108, at 147.
120 See ALA. LAWS ch. 36 (1859-60) (all); ARK. LAWS ch. 151 (1858) (almost all); GA.
LAWS ch. 91 (1859) (all by will); LA. LAWS ch. 69 (1857) (all); MD. LAWS ch. 322 (1860)
(all); Miss. REV. CODE 236 (1857) (all); N.C. LAWS 69 (1860-61) (all by will); REPUBLIC OF
TEXAS LAWS 19 (1838) (all).
121 See TUSHNET, supra note 117, at 193.
122 Id. at 194.
123 See Interview with Israel Jefferson, in BLASSINGAME, supra note 109, at 481, 483-84.
124 See Interview with Mr. Bradwell, in id. at 391.
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In the 1820s, Quaker organizations held 800 such nominal slaves in
North Carolina. 25 We encounter wills requiring heirs to hold
slaves as "free to all intents and purposes forever," or to ask "no
other service or wages ...than may be sufficient to pay their
taxes,' 26 or to let them be "as free as the laws of the state will
allow. ' 127 Some masters treated slaves this way during their life-
times. A Tennessee planter noted that one family of nineteen
" 'slaves' . . . 'have been living to themselves for about twenty
years, they have supported themselves on the lands of their master
and are tolerable farmers.' "128 However, it should be noted that
any such alternative to legal freedom left the nominal slave vulner-
able to real enslavement by the nominal owner's creditors.
If masters and slaves intent on contracting sometimes worked
their way around the law, they sometimes simply ignored it. Ala-
bama attempted to discourage self-purchase by forbidding slaves to
trade as freemen; yet the Alabama case of Stanley v. Nelson re-
vealed a slave subleasing his own time from the man to whom he
was hired, so that he could operate a painting business which in
turn borrowed capital from yet another white hiring the time of
other slaves from other masters. 29 Even in states permitting man-
umission, many masters freed their slaves informally to escape such
burdensome obligations as posting bonds or paying their slaves'
way to another state. 3 °
Thus, while legal restrictions on manumission may have re-
duced the amount of bargaining over status, they may have simply
driven it out of sight. Rather than reinforcing the credibility of the
low manumission rates derivable from census data, legal impedi-
ments undermine it.131 The censuses of 1850 and 1860 measured
only legal manumissions taking place within the Southern states.
32
Thus, they missed slaves held in quasi-freedom by relatives,
churches or masters, slaves manumitted informally, and slaves
manumitted after migration to free states. The emancipation of
Ella Shepard's stepmother, for example, would not likely have
come to the attention of census takers as either a manumission or
125 See BERLIN, supra note 108, at 143.
126 WATSON, supra note 105, at 76 (1989).
127 See TUSHNET, supra note 117, at 198 (quoting Drane v. Beall); see also BERLIN, supra
note 108, at 144.
128 BERLIN, supra note 108, at 148 (footnote omitted).
129 See TUSHNET, supra note 117, at 199.
130 See BERLIN, supra note 108, at 145.
131 See FOGEL & ENGERMANN, supra note 66, at 151; PATrERSON, supra note 32, at 273.
132 See 1860 CENSUS at 137.
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an escape.133 Ella Shepard's father bbught himself but was unable
to negotiate the purchase of her mother who was sold South. Ac-
cordingly, he bought a new wife and held her as a slave so that they
could remain in Tennessee where he had a prosperous business.
Later, fearing that she would be claimed by his creditors, he ab-
sconded with her to Ohio, leaving all his property behind. Thus his
wife ceased to be a slave without being formally manumitted and
without becoming a fugitive.
134
To the extent that legal impediments to manumission were ef-
fective, they provide a second reason for discounting the 1850 cen-
sus on which many rely. These impediments increased greatly
between the Revolution and the Civil War.135 They were further
reenforced by the new Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 which reduced
the bargaining power of slaves by reducing opportunities for es-
cape. If the law more effectively discouraged manumission in the
decade before the Civil War, we must assume that manumission
rates were higher at earlier points. Fogel and Engermann actually
employ this assumption when they point to the precipitous drop in
the growth rate of the free black population after 1840.136 If escape
and manumission were always as infrequent as the 1850 census as-
serted, it is difficult to explain the presence in 1860 of half a million
free blacks.' 37 Thus, it has been estimated that 50,000 slaves were
manumitted in the state of Maryland alone.
138
Moreover, in assessing manumission's presence in the imagi-
nations of slaveholders and slaves alike, it is important to remem-
ber that past experience would be more important than future
experience. Therefore, a temporary restriction of opportunities for
manumission during the lifespan of the last generation of slaves
may have little reduced the cultural importance of manumission as
a permeable boundary of slave status.
If the legal impediments to manumission were surmountable,
why weren't there even more manumissions? We can explain this
result in economic terms. The closing of the foreign slave trade
increased the replacement cost of slaves and so raised the prices
masters could demand for-and from-their slaves. We may get a
133 See Interview with Ella Shepard, in BLASSINGAME, supra note 109, at 611-14.
134 See id. at 611-13.
135 See GENOVESE, supra note 42, at 51; STAMPp, supra note 23, at 232-34.
136 See FOGEL & ENGERMANN, supra note 66, at 37.
137 See 1860 CENSUS at 131.
138 See BARBARA J. FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND: MARY-
LAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 15 (1985); Calderhead, How Extensive Was the
Border-State Slave Trade? A New Look, 18 CIv. WAR HIsT. 42 (1972).
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rough idea of the odds facing a self-purchaser by considering the
following hypothetical example. In 1850 a forty-year-old male
slave could bring an average of about $650 on the open market.139
During the previous twenty years of his working life, such a slave
might have generated an average of $115 of gross annual income
for his master, while costing his master an annual average of $40
for his subsistence. 140 To put by enough to purchase himself at the
market price, such a slave would have had to be patient, disciplined
and lucky enough to outproduce the average by thirty percent,
over this twenty year period, and to retain all of this surplus. A
skilled slave could, of course, earn more than the average slave, but
would also have to pay more for his freedom. A free black artisan
could perhaps earn the purchase price of a ten-year-old child in
two years, if he lived alone-and lived no better than a slave.141 In
light of these economic barriers, it seems possible that the legal
distribution of property between Southern whites and blacks,
rather than legal restraints on the ability of whites to alienate their
property, explains the relative rarity of manumission by purchase.
If so, what we call status in Southern society was the product of a
market, not a deviation from it.
While not every manumission was negotiated, not every nego-
tiation led to manumission, so that the number of actual manumis-
sions understates the importance of manumission in the culture of
slavery. For every slave manumitted or purchased from slavery,
there were countless others who may have aspired to such a fate
and engaged their masters in explicit or implicit negotiations to
achieve it. Frederick Douglass recalled that the co-conspirators in
his first attempted escape "all ... had dim hopes of being set free,
some day, by their masters. '142 For example, John Hartwell Cocke,
an avid colonizationist, managed a distant plantation by offering
every slave freedom in return for honesty, fidelity, temperance-
and $1400. Despite imposing rigorous regimes of religious instruc-
139 See FOGEL & ENGERMANN, supra note 66, at 76.
140 These estimates are very rough, based on Fogel & Engerman's figures for the aver-
age net earnings of slaves by age in 1850, for the average inflation in the price of slaves
between 1820 and 1860, and the average subsistence cost in 1850 for an adult male slave.
See id. at 99, 151.
141 Berlin estimates that even skilled African-Americans faced enormous economic ob-
stacles to earning enough to purchase themselves or loved ones. A skilled slave-or pre-
sumably free black-could earn a bit more than $200 per year in the decade before the
Civil War. BERLIN, supra note 108, at 154-55; FOGEL & ENGERMANN, supra note 66, at
152. In 1850 the average price of a ten-year-old child was $300. See id. at 76.




tion and overtime work over a twenty-year period, Cocke appar-
ently found only three of these privileged slaves worthy of
manumission.
43
Those who would deny the contractual element in master-
slave relations must also contend with the various degrees of quasi-
freedom that fell short of the also attenuated "freedom" of manu-
mission, but that nevertheless gave slaves some authority to dis-
pose of their labor. Despite the rigors of the slave regime, or even
as part of it, most slaves had disposition over some of their labor.
The maintenance of a labor force itself requires a certain amount
of labor and expense-an expense which masters could reduce by
offering the slaves barely adequate time for childrearing, house-
keeping, crafts, gardening, and hunting.1'" Sometimes such slave
autonomy profited the master in unexpected ways. Harriet Marti-
neau recalled one slave asking his master "what he would give him
for two bee-holes. 'You are a pretty fellow,' said his master, 'to ask
me to pay for my own trees.' The negro urged that his master
would never have found the bee-holes for himself; which was very
true.' 1 45 Many slaves were offered financial incentives "either as
incentive bonuses designed to stimulate productivity, or more fre-
quently, as a return for work done during time that was recognized
as the slaves' own."'1 46 And as we have seen, some slaves were
given wide discretion to dispose of their own labor, paying a
monthly rent on themselves. In the case of those who purchased
themselves, this rent often resembled a mortgage payment, with
the slave acquiring title in herself before or after payment of the
principal was complete.
Those who would define slavery as property in humans and
freedom as self-ownership must therefore confront the paradox
that all slaves had some property interest in themselves. 47 While I
would not deny that self-ownership was an important index of free-
143 See MILLER, supra note 86, at 23-36, 63, 110. The only three manumittees from the
Hopewell plantation were Ann Sucky Faulcon and her children Agnes and George. Ann
died en route to Liberia. The plantation population grew from 49 in 1840 to 70 in 1860.
See id. at 142.
144 See GENOVESE, supra note 42, at 497-99, 503, 529-31, 535-40.
145 Id. at 306 (footnote omitted) (quoting Harriet Martineau).
146 Id. at 314; see also FOGEL & ENGERMANN, supra note 66, at 240-41.
147 Professor Benedict's Comment objects that slave status could not be viewed as con-
tractual because a contract is an enforceable agreement. See Benedict, supra note 3, at
2109. Since I argue that slaves could bring to bear informal enforcement pressures, and
that purchase contracts could be enforced by relatives or white intermediaries, I assume he
means that a contract is enforceable by a court at the request of a party to it. Benedict
similarly objects to my claim that slaves' disposition over some of their labor gave them a
partial property interest in themselves, responding that "property consists of legally recog-
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dom for all parties, I think we must recognize it as a continuum
along which master and slave were engaged in a constant struggle.
I would deny that the continuum ended with self-ownership. In-
stead, slave society recognized disposition over labor as a capital
resource like any other-like land, seed, livestock, and equipment.
Owning more of one's self meant more freedom, to be sure-but
so did owning more land, more animals, and more people. In other
words, the more access to capital resources one had, the more valu-
able one's property interest in oneself became. If slavery taught
African-Americans the possessive individualist lesson that the self
was a capital resource, it also taught the Hegelian lesson that ac-
cess to capital was an essential part of the self.
This perspective on the self is starkly clear in the terse self-
description offered by W. Hawley to the American Freedmen's In-
quiry Commission in 1863.
W. Hawley said he was formerly a slave, but bought himself, at
the age of 24, for $1620, which was to be paid in eight years, and
he earned it all and paid it all, and became free. He then went
hard to work and earned more money, and bought his sister for
$850. He now has two drays, two horses, owns his own house,
and considers himself worth two thousand dollars.
14 8
Here we have labor valued in terms of the property it secures, and
property valued as an index of the labor that produced it, and both
measures of self-worth fusing in Hawley's initial ability to earn the
high price of his own purchase. The freedmen's inquiry commis-
sion interviews are full of such narratives of labor followed by self-
nized and enforceable rights." Id. at 2110. And he argues that quasi-freedom enjoyed by
some slaves "was more 'quasi' than 'freedom.' " Id.
These objections reveal a fundamental jurisprudential disagreement between Profes-
sor Benedict and myself. Professor Benedict apparently identifies legal rights with judicial
remedies. In my view, the reality of rights depends on their enforcement by any means
available, formal or not. Stateless societies such as medieval Iceland have had legal prop-
erty regimes without state enforcement. See generally WILLIAM 1. MILLER, BLOODTAKING
AND PEACEMAKING (1990). Customary international law is a similarly decentralized sys-
tem. Courts cannot effectively enforce rights in the face of mass resistance or noncoopera-
tion. The effectiveness of any right therefore depends upon its recognition not only or
primarily by courts, but by myriad other social actors. The courts do not have a practical,
and need have no theoretical, monopoly on the power to identify rights.
Thus, in assessing the practical difference of manumission made in the ability of Afri-
can-Americans to dispose of their labor, we must factor in the informal powers exercised
by slaves and the informal disabilities faced by freed persons. When we do so, we may find
that the freedom enjoyed by free persons of color-both before and after slavery's "aboli-
tion"-was also more quasi than freedom. Freedom of contract would mean little to
Southern Blacks if none but their former masters would employ them, or if vigilante vio-
lence was the price of exercising their rights.
148 Interview with W. Hawley, in BLASSINGAME, supra note 109, at 394.
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ownership, the acquisition of property, and generous provision for
the freedom, education or housing of relatives. 149 These phyloge-
nies of freedom are reminiscent of, and surely drew upon, Republi-
can propaganda depicting the metamorphosis of employee into
employer.150 But they demonstrate even more clearly the identifi-
cation of freedom with prosperity and power, rather than disposi-
tion over labor, because these paragons of the puritan ethic made
labor contracts while they were still slaves.
Economist Douglas North summarizes this interpretation of
slavery as the labor contract made by an extremely impoverished
but not completely unpropertied laborer:
There is, in fact, an implicit contract between the . .. [master
and slave]; to get maximum effort from the slave, the owner
must devote resources to monitoring and metering a slave's out-
put and critically applying rewards and punishments based on
performance. Because there are increasing marginal costs to
measuring and policing performance, the master will stop short
of perfect policing and will engage instead in policing until the
marginal costs equal the additional marginal benefits from such
activity. The result is that slaves acquire certain property rights
in their own labor. That is, owners are able to enhance the value
of their property by granting slaves some rights in exchange for
services the owners value more. Hence slaves became owners
too. Indeed it is only this ownership that made it possible for
slaves to purchase their own freedom, as was frequently done in
classical times and even occasionally in the antebellum South.
15 1
If the making of labor contracts was part of the slave experi-
ence, it follows that slaves could become wage laborers and yet still
149 See, e.g., Interview with Cox, in BLASSINGAME, supra note 109; Interview with An-
drew Fredhew, in id. at 391, Interview with William Howard, in id. at 394 (all prosperous
self-purchasers who had purchased relatives and sent them to Oberlin College).
150 See Binder, Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation, supra note 98, at 1448-49.
151 DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 32 (1990) (citing Barzel, An Economic Analysis of Slavery, 20 LAW & ECON. 87
(1977)). For a more elaborate analysis of the slave as a debt-peon, or contract-laborer, see
Barzel, supra, at 91, 96-97. Barzel argues that the compulsory labor aspect of slavery
should be viewed as a way of policing debt-contracts, not as an alternative to contracting.
Assuming policing was costless to the employer, the employer would keep the slave work-
ing at the maximal effort consistent with the reproduction of the laborer's labor power
simply by appropriating all of the slave's output until it reached the equivalent of the
slave's maximal sustainable output minus the consumption necessary to sustain that maxi-
mum. But to the extent such policing can be more cheaply accomplished by the laborer
than by the employer, the laborer can command additional compensation in the form of
consumption, leisure, cash, workplace autonomy, or other amenities. In paying the laborer
to guard the employer's property interest in the loan, the employer transfers some of that
interest to the laborer, just as a small business owner gives up some of her ownership
interest to the mobster to whom she pays protection.
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feel enslaved. In contemporary Colombia, some descendants of
slaves apparently still view plantation employment for wages as a
cowardly contract, that is, contractual slavery. Believing that only
by selling one's soul can a wage laborer earn enough to achieve
economic independence, descendants of slaves report much con-
tracting with the devil among plantation workers. Although per-
sonally enriching, such contracts break faith with the contractor's
ancestry and posterity, since they do not involve maintaining and
bequeathing a family estate. According to the traditions of this
community, the devil's wages, no matter how remunerative, can
only be consumed in the form of luxury items rather than passed
on as capital. To these allodial farmers, subsistence agriculture is
the only source of real wealth. Attempts to reinvest wages in land
or livestock will therefore prove fruitless: the devil's seed is sterile
and nothing it buys can grow or reproduce. The social isolation of
the wage worker, reinterpreted in peasant morality as an excess of
selfishness, results in the alienation of the very independence
sought.152 In this way, the wage contract reproduces the social
death that was slavery.
I should make clear at this point what I am saying and what I
am not. In stressing the role of bargaining in establishing the work-
ing conditions of slaves I am not saying that any aspect of slavery
was voluntary. To the contrary, I am contesting the commonplace
assumption that bargaining is a form of freedom rather than coer-
cion. Nor am I saying that most slaves had as much bargaining
power in slavery and as much prosperity in "freedom," as did W.
Hawley. 153 But neither am I implying that Hawley's unusual eco-
nomic autonomy meant that he was never a slave or that he ever
152 See TAUSSIG, THE DEVIL AND COMMODITY FETISHISM IN SOUTH AMERICA 94-95,
133-34 (1980).
153 It is noteworthy that the federal writers' project interviews tell a very different story
from the Freedmens' inquiry commission interviews. The former slaves interviewed by the
federal writers' project in the 1930s had been children or young adults when emancipation
came to the South and therefore had little opportunity to purchase themselves. By the
Great Depression, even those few that had prospered in freedom for a time were generally
as destitute and helpless as they were ancient. Looking back from this miserable retire-
ment to a dimly remembered childhood in which most of the rigors of slavery had not yet
been felt, many waxed nostalgic. Those who had achieved adulthood could look back on
slavery as a time when they were vigorous, useful, and hence valuable: "You used to be
worth a thousand dollars then, but you're not worth two bits now. You ain't worth nothin',
when you're free." Armstrong, quoted in BULLWHIP DAYS: THE SLAVES REMEMBER, AN
ORAL HISTORY 456 (J.J. Mellon ed., 1988). Because most former slaves had so little eco-
nomic bargaining power after emancipation, they could actually feel less valued by their
employers than when they were owned. When confronted with their economic vulnerabil-
ity in a "free" labor market, a few former slaves actually experienced status degradation.
According to Sara Debro,
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became fully free. Finally, I am engaged in no insurgency against
the concept of "status." Slave status was real, but had less to do
with an individual's inability to bargain over the conditions of her
labor than with the power she had in bargaining. Thus, slave status
was a condition of social isolation and political powerlessness; one
of the effects of this status was a degradation of the economic bar-
gaining power of all African-Americans. Thus conceived, slave sta-
tus was a collective condition, and hence not one that individuals
could buy their way out of.
VII. RACE AS STATUS
Northern whites could believe that the right to make and
break labor contracts eliminated status distinctions only by strip-
ping status of its social dimension and reducing it to a relationship
between the individual and the state. However hierarchical, social
relations could then be viewed as private matters, determined by
contractual consent between jural equals; social isolation was
equally a function of contractual consent. By ignoring the rela-
tional quality of status evident to white and black Southerners
alike, Northern Republicans could deny that emancipation affected
the status of anyone but the slaves themselves. After the Civil War
this belief made it possible for Northern whites to retreat from
their bellicose view of the South as an alien society of sadists and
self-proclaimed aristocrats, and return to the comfortable position
that it was the presence of slaves rather than the practices of mas-
ters that was alien.
Thus, the notion of status often had an asymmetric application
for Northern whites: only the subordinated were ascribed any sta-
tus at all. Masters could therefore be deprived of their slaves with
no loss of status because ownership of slaves conferred no special
status upon them. Deprived of their human property, planters
could remain proprietors-indeed implicit in the conception of
slavery as property is the assumption that mastery is an accidental
property of the owner, a property she can alienate without altering
her own identity.
[t]hem was bad days. I'd rather been a slave than to been hired out like I was,
,cause I wasn't no field hand, I was a handmaid, trained to wait on the la-
dies .... I ain't never forgot them slavery days, and I ain't never forgot Miss
Polly and my white starched aprons.
Interview with S. Debro, in BEFORE FREEDOM: 48 HISTORIES OF NORTH AND SOUTH CAR-
OLINA SLAVES 50-51 (Hurmence ed., 1990).
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Conceived as property in humans, slavery is perfectly compati-
ble with a society ordered by contract. It is contract rather than
status that orders relations among the free, while the unfree have
no social relations. From amidst the dynamism of market society,
Northern whites may have envisioned the slave as economically
valuable but socially inert-as object rather than agent. 154 Hence
the presence or absence of slavery could be considered sociologi-
cally irrelevant, an accidental property of an essentially liberal
market society. If slavery was indeed inessential, it could be abol-
ished without affecting the character of society. Upon emancipa-
tion, slaves would simply drop into the fluid medium of contractual
relations, where they would disappear without a trace.1 55
Imagining that contractual relations placed the participants
outside of status hierarchy, Northerners were tempted to discard
status as a modality for identifying all members of society. Instead,
status came to be viewed as the accidental and undesirable prop-
erty of an alien minority. In this way, the Republican party's aspi-
ration to abolish slavery remained enslaved by the traditional
understanding of emancipation as the manumission of individuals.
In its asymmetry, the concept of status came to be isomorphic
with the concept of race. Despite the popularity of racial taxono-
mies of humankind during the nineteenth century, we find the con-
cept of race being deployed as an adjectival rather than a modal
quality, afflicting some people more than others. Emerson, for ex-
ample, informed his admiring audiences that "race in the negro is
of appalling importance.' 1 56  Nineteenth century Americans
equated "race" with the innate determination of personality, as op-
posed to the self-creation that romantics-like Emerson-associ-
ated with freedom. 57 Hence in ascribing more "race" to Africans,
white Americans reassured themselves that the unfreedom of Afri-
cans was a natural fact rather than a social condition. One popular
treatise on "the Negro Race" reported that: "All the facts which
have been collected, concur to prove how constant and indelible
are the natural and moral characteristics of negroes in every cli-
154 Martin Luther King believed that this white image of blacks persisted to his own day:
"Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes
an "I-it" relationship for an "I-thou" relationship and ends up relegating persons to the
status of things." MARTIN L. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 85 (1964).
155 See ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 100-02
(1980).
156 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, English Traits, in II WORKS 21 (Bohn ed., 1856).
157 See CHARLES tAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SoCIETY 1-23 (1979) (problem of de-
fining freedom posed by romanticism, to which Hegel responds).
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mate, notwithstanding a diversity of circumstances, which condemn
him to indolence and degradation."' 58
Developmental stasis-an inability to progress by adapting to
new circumstances-struck some northerners as a natural explana-
tion for the legal affliction of status. Dr. John H. Van Evrie of New
York, a Civil War era popularizer of "scientific" racism, explained
variations in ability and achievement among caucasians by refer-
ence to environment, while assuming that the potential of all blacks
was genetically limited. 159 But while Van Evrie was a supporter of
slavery, the view that only whites were naturally fit for freedom
also found expression among enthusiasts of abolition. In endorsing
Henry Sumner Maine's celebrated claim that civilized society inev-
itably progressed from status to contract, John Fiske elided legal
and biological evolution: "the progress of society, like that or orga-
nisms, is throughout, a process of adaptation."' 60 Seeing the indi-
vidual independence of contractual society as a source of
flexibility, Fiske celebrated it as an evolutionary advantage, en-
abling the specialization that Herbert Spencer saw as the key to
successful adaptation.16' Yet flexible institutions seemed to Fiske
as much the result as the cause of evolutionary progress, since
adaptability was more characteristic of the Aryan than of other
races. 162 For Fiske, the legal independence of whites was the prod-
uct of their independence from nature. Whites could magnani-
mously extinguish the legal status of blacks, but not the biological
stasis that had given rise to it.
If destined by nature, the degradation of Africans could be
viewed as a circumstance beyond the power of whites to create or
alter. Thus the impingement of necessity on the lives of whites
could be externalized and embodied in the blacks among them. As
the volatility of economic life made white Americans increasingly
conscious of the fragility of their economic independence,'163 as the
158 J. VIREY, NATURAL HISTORY OF THE NEGRO RACE 19 (1837).
159 See GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DE-
BATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY 1817-1914, at 92-93 (1971).
160 Fiske, supra note 95, at 221.
161 See id. at 218-21, 228-29.
162 [W]here there has been marked social progress there has been marked ethnic
differentiation. The widely spread tribes of unprogressive American Indians,
now so rapidly disappearing, have retained to the end their ancient physical,
intellectual, and moral homogeneity. But in the descendants of the primitive
Indo-Europeans, from the flabby and pursy Hindu to the wiry and long-limbed
Kentuckian, may be seen the immense heterogeneity entailed by long-contin-
ued differences of social organization and physical environment.
Id. at 217.
163 See generally STEINFELD, supra note 96.
1996] 2099
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
accelerating conflict over slavery convinced Northerners and
Southerners alike that they were losing control over their political
destiny, this displacement of necessity onto "the Negro race" must
have held increasing appeal. Just as masters began to view their
slaves as "a duty and a burden, ' 164 Northern yeomen saw them-
selves slipping into the grip of the ambiguously titled "Slave
Power.' 1 65 Both sides saw the slave as an emblem of necessity to
be overcome, confined, cordoned off, or expelled. Even while
viewing themselves as freer by nature than "the Negro," whites
nevertheless identified "the Negro" with that nature by which they
themselves felt enslaved.
This asymmetric ascription of race continues down to the pres-
ent. The American system of racial classification remains unique in
treating any proportion of African descent as a taint. As Neil Go-
tanda has pointed out, this peculiar asymmetry is a legacy of Amer-
ican slavery's association of race and status:
[O]ur particular system of classification, with its metaphorical
construction of racial purity for whites, has a specific history as a
badge of enslaveability. As such, the metaphor of purity is not a
logical oddity, but an integral part of the construction of the sys-
tem of racial subordination embedded in American society.
166
Professor Gotanda has argued that even in contemporary Ameri-
can culture only nonwhites are recognized as "having" race, while
caucasians, the normal case, are raceless. 167 Thus, the assumptions
persist to this day that "racial problems" are the problems of per-
sons of color only, and that social policy should fix these afflicted
individuals while leaving whites alone.
Neither the manumission of slaves nor the marketing of black
labor challenged the fundamental assumptions of slave society, for
neither posed a serious threat to white governance of blacks. Thus
emancipation could merely extend practices already present in
Southern society and already circumscribed by a racial ideology
shared with the North. The identifications of Africa with slavery
and of negritude with necessity suggest that freedom was in large
164 See GENOVESE, supra note 42, at 49-70.
165 See DAVID B. DAVIS, THE SLAVE-POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE
(1969).
166 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution is Color Blind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34
(1991). For further discussions of the* American system of racial classification, see VIR-
GINIA R. DOMfNGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN CREOLE LoU-
SIANA (1986); JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULLATOES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1980); JORDAN, supra note 52; EDWARD B. REUTER, THE MULATTO IN
THE UNITED STATES (1918).
167 See Neil Gotanda, Lecture at Critical Legal Studies Conference (Oct. 1988).
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measure identified by antebellum whites as freedom from the
black race. Against the background of these assumptions, emanci-
pation could hardly have meant freedom for the black race. In-
stead, emancipation would remain the authority of whites to keep
race under control by governing those afflicted with it.
CONCLUSION
Universal manumission does not necessarily abolish slavery.
The institution of slavery has generally included mechanisms for
the manumission of slaves and their passage into a limbo-like sta-
tus combining freedom with social subordination and relative isola-
tion. This was true of American slavery as well. If the institution
of slavery is defined to include the process of manumission and the
subordinate status of the manumitted, then the institution of slav-
ery may be said to survive the reclassification of all slaves as
manumittees. Arguably, that is what has occurred in the United
States. If so, slavery persists, and the Thirteenth Amendment re-
mains unenforced.
Slavery arguably survives in the institution of race. Conceived
as a perpetuation of the institution of slavery, race is, like slavery, a
hereditary status. It is the status into which all slaves were
manumitted and which free blacks occupied before the Civil War.
It is the status which all descendants of slaves occupy today. The
legal disabilities associated with this status have been altered or
eliminated since the Civil War, but the social status remains. To
occupy this status is to be the object of ascription of race as a char-
acteristic. The descendants of slaves are "raced," and others may
be raced as well, by analogy to this paradigmatic group. Whites are
not raced, so that on this view, talk of racial discrimination against
whites involves a category error or rhetorical obfuscation.
The status of race is a group rather than individual disability.
The vulnerability of African-Americans to enslavement reduced
the economic opportunities, bargaining leverage, and political and
social power of all African-Americans, whether or not enslaved.
By reducing economic opportunity and bargaining leverage for
free blacks, the institution of slavery reduced their property in
themselves, placing them on a continuum with, rather than across a
categorical boundary from, their enslaved but nevertheless enter-
prising compatriots. The status of race operates similarly to reduce
but not eliminate the political and social power and the self-owner-
ship of all African-Americans.
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This way of conceiving racial subordination as a perpetuation
of slavery highlights the institutional nature of both the liberty pro-
tected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the equality protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. It implies that conferring on individ-
uals the right to sell their labor does not make them free, and that
conferring on individuals the right to race-neutral treatment does
not make them equal. This suggests the general implications for
constitutional law of the embeddedness of slavery in cultural and
social configurations that survived universal manumission: a more
collective conception of liberty and equality rights and a readier
resort to institutional reform to remedy their violation. These gen-
eral recommendations are familiar albeit no less important for that.
More interestingly, if less importantly, the cultural and social
persistence of slavery also accounts for the sense of crisis evident in
constitutional theory since the advent of the "Second Reconstruc-
tion." American constitutional interpretation has always pro-
ceeded on the assumption that America's evolving society and
culture were sources of authority and legitimacy for what were in-
evitably contingent, discretionary interpretations of America's de-
signedly imprecise constitution. But the immanence of slavery
throughout American society and culture imply that the constitu-
tion's most important and least precise passages-the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments-delegitimate the very society and culture upon
which constitutional interpretation depends.
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